Uses subtle difference in TCP network stacks in order to determine the source operating system of TCP connections. By exposing the operating system of the source IP, many interesting policy decisions become enforceable. I really should get around to publishing a paper about this some day.
Uses the nuances of the SPARC architecture to enforce hardware protection of the stack saved return pointer under OpenBSD. Activated in OpenBSD -current in May '04 when someone braver than I hacked up GDB support.
A Motorola 68HC12 Microprocessor and peripheral simulator co-written with Richard Kennell (kennell@ecn.purdue.edu). GUI and Assembler written by Rick can be fetched via CVS as ide6812 and asm6812 respectively.
A thin C Compiler for the Motorola 68HC12 Micro. Supports a subset
of the C language. It is in the pre code generation phase right now.
Does pseudo LL parsing of most of the language with the exception of
arithmatic expressions which are LR.
(This project is likely on permanent hold; it has gotten boring)
IP Stack Integrity Checker
ISIC is a suite of utilities to exercise the stability of an IP Stack and its component stacks (TCP, UDP, ICMP et. al.) It generates piles of pseudo random packets of the target protocol. The packets can be given tendancies to conform to. Ie 50% of the packets generated can have IP Options. 25% of the packets can be IP fragments... But the percentages are arbitrary and most of the packet fields have a configurable tendancy.
The ISIC homepage has been moved to PacketFactory.
http://www.packetfactory.net/Projects/ISIC/
Firewall MAPper
FMAP (yes, I know it sounds funny) sits behind a firewall while ISIC or another packet transmitter hurls packets at/through the firewall. Similar to filterrules, it generates a list of ports that appear to be open on the firewall. It also tabulates statistics about things that should not have gotten through the firewall. Ie: IP options, ftp-data sourceport... It allows the firewall admin/auditor to experimentally determine the firewall rules instead of trusting the firewall to do exactly what it claims to do.
Depends on PCAP
A kernel space stateful firewall. Currently builds and works under OpenBSD. Solaris port contingent on a acquiring a 64bit compiler. It was born on June 8th 2000 and blocked its first TCP packet on June 11th 2000. Update: TCP filtering is stateful and works like a champ.
This is dead and buried. Dug Song conscripted me into the OpenBSD posse to hack on dhartmei's PF packet filter.
A transparent application proxying firewall.
Proxies:ftp - essentially done pop3 - does not yet look at inner envelope smtp - does not yet look at inner envelope snmp-trap - done ssh - done (no it doesn't do a man-in-the-middle attack) syslog - done tcp-plug - done tcp-skeleton - done telnet - finishing up environment negotiation udp-plug - essentially done imap4 - in progress